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A Contemporary Reading of Augustine’s Confessions
Sharon Cantor
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, PA
Using the technical language and conceptual framework of
contemporary literary theory, Michel Foucault’s Discipline &
Punish defines medieval torture as a mechanism of domination that
is reconstituted in modern penal practices. He writes that torture
“traces around, or, rather, on the very body of the condemned man
signs that must not be effaced,” adding that the “tortured body is
first inscribed in the legal ceremonial that must produce, open for all
to see, the truth of the crime” (Foucault 34-35). Through terms such
as “traces,” “signs,” and “inscribed,” Foucault characterizes the
body as a textual space upon which physical marks become linguis-
tic “signs” that signal discursive “truth.” Through the repetition of
“must” and the phrases “legal ceremonial” and “open for all to see,”
Foucault attests that these signs whose locus is the prisoner’s body
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are part of both a visual display and a communicative act. Com-
manding intent must inform the message and an audience must
observe it in order for meaning to occur. In other words, Foucault
conceives of medieval torture as a ritual that establishes and records
public meaning.
Foucault’s assumption that meaning is contextual challenges
a foundational belief in medieval Christendom, namely that truth is
located in God. Faith in God as the ultimate arbiter of truth informs
public rituals such as the torture Foucault describes. Foucault’s
discordant viewpoint suggests the question of whether theory’s
terminology may accurately address all performances and texts,
particularly those that themselves employ specialized terms for
signification and representation. One such example of a problematic
pre-modern text is Augustine’s Confessions, which contemplates
the nature and function of representations gesturing toward divine
Truth. Though Augustine proceeds from an antithetical assumption,
his terminology in translation and organization of ideas are remark-
ably and perhaps deceptively similar to those of contemporary
literary theorists such as the Lacan, Foucault, and Derrida. Parsing
Augustine’s intended meaning and the connotations of terms such as
“sign,” “image,” and “the Word” may offer insight into the extent to
which contemporary theory may improve or detract from under-
standing of the Confessions.
Signification in Augustine’s view begins with a God who is
coincident with the Holy Spirit, Truth, “the Word,” and Christ “the
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Word made flesh” (226-27). “The Word” specifically connotes the
infinite performative by which, on a mortal level, creation originates
and passes through time. Human language imitates God’s Word yet
produces only imprecise, sequential auditory “images,” or represen-
tations, of the objects God continuously pronounces into being
(Augustine 225-26). Christ too has special connotative status
because he takes human form. Augustine believes that Christ’s
sacrifice lies partly in the self-debasement or “humility” to express
the Word in human terms (219). Scriptural language gestures
toward the Word by virtue of Christ’s unique status, as well as by
the multiplicity of meanings for a given utterance, layering many
simultaneous truths upon a single word (266-71).
Discussing meaning in the living absence of Christ, August-
ine makes a distinction between foreknowledge of God – an innate
yet inchoate awareness of divine grace – and the objects of thought
and memory, which are “images” of God’s Word. Expressing the
Platonic axiom that the impulse to self-preservation constitutes “a
mark of [God’s] profound latent unity from whence [Augustine]
derived [his] being,” or an early awareness of God’s grace, August-
ine writes that “an inward instinct” bids him to value truth and “take
care of the integrity of [his] senses” (22) even in childhood. The
phrases “profound latent unity,” “inward instinct,” and “take care of
the integrity” suggest an intelligence of the origin of being, and its
wholeness in the eternal, concealed within the human mind. Affinity
for truth and unimpaired judgment is instinctual in that it asserts itself
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as an “inward” or subjective drive without being willed or under-
stood. Augustine suggests that a person’s most private self is
something motivated by God and partially understandable as such.
In Book X of the Confessions, Augustine situates fore-
knowledge of the Word in human memory – a Platonic conception
whereby thinking “gather[s] together ideas which… [previously] lay
hidden, scattered, and neglected” (189), drawing insight through the
process of recollection. Depicting memory as the domain of the
“hidden,” as well as a “huge cavern, with its mysterious, secret, and
indescribable nooks and crannies” – or inscrutable contents and
workings – defines truth’s inaccessibility as a problem of language.
In particular, the pairing of “mysterious” and “secret” with “inde-
scribable” relates memory’s unintelligibility to the impossibility of
articulation. Despite language’s extreme diminution and remoteness
from the Word, unmediated at present by “the Word made flesh,”
Augustine maintains that a person’s spiritual state and the under-
standing permitted by God may nonetheless guide him toward Truth
through the Bible and human intermediaries.
Much like Augustine, Jacques Lacan envisions an origin of
selfhood that is coincident with unconscious assimilation of a
compelling ideal. However, his theory diverges from Augustine’s in
ways that make it difficult to discuss the Confessions using
Lacanian terminology. Lacan locates selfhood’s origin in the “mirror
stage” or the developmental period during which a child first under-
stands his reflection as his own. The moment when a child
43
“assum[es],” or identifies as part of himself, his mirror image gener-
ates both the “I function,” or subjectivity, and an “ideal-I” image or
object. In other words, selfhood is “irreducibly” relational, the
composite of an observer and his reflection. As the nearly helpless
infant perceives a virtual space that obeys him, he foretastes matu-
ration in the form of a “mirage”: the “ideal-I” who commands his
space entirely. According to Lacan, this phantom self-image resides
in the unconscious and manifests symbolically in self-projections,
converses, and doubles (3-7).
For both Augustine and Lacan, the mind from its birth
harbors an inconceivable ideal. In addition, for both thinkers, this
ideal compels the subject to strive toward its origin. However,
Lacan’s “ideal-I” is wholly imaginary and confined to the uncon-
scious, constituting a reflection of a real object and prohibiting any
transcendence of the human mind, both of which qualities mark it as
beneath the “I function” in Augustine’s ontology. Lacan’s apparent
alienation of consciousness from the unconscious echoes
Augustine’s insistence that thought is far distant from foreknowledge
of the Word. However, for both thinkers, these seemingly rigid
distinctions fail on the subject of language. Lacan seats the language
function in the unconscious, noting the complex relations among
“signifiers,” or material components of language, that produce
signification through shifting discursive context and associative links,
such as metaphor and metonymy. A metaphor invokes two “equally
actualized” or fully manifested signifiers, one of which is a “trace,”
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or literally unexpressed marker, that exists metonymically in a text.
The presence of this second term may be appreciated uncon-
sciously, generating the infinite associative links that make up
language (Lacan 145-48).
Treating the unconscious as comparable to Augustine’s
“secret” memories is itself problematic. Augustine relates language
to the Word only partly in analogue to the Lacanian view that
unconscious associations drive communication; an imperfect com-
parison has Augustine’s divine foreknowledge direct the behavior of
unwitting human subjects. Lacan’s unconscious holds no attachment
to stable, external Truth. If anything, it attaches merely to symbolic
pre-language, a cognitive state more primitive than and internal to
itself. Conversely, Augustine’s consciousness seeks a potential
reconciliation in Truth through external powers such as Christ “the
Word made flesh,” both redeemer and mediator for mankind, and
the Holy Scripture. Both Augustine and Lacan assume a multi-
sectioned mind, but only Augustine’s components of memory are
compatible and secured within a greater external entity. Lacan’s
emphasis on the dominion of the unconscious renders any Lacanian
interpretation of Augustine difficult at best, since the Confessions
expounds upon ways in which the mind’s limitations may be tran-
scended.
One such vehicle of transcendence is the Scriptures.
Augustine sees genius in the Bible’s apparent simplicity and insinu-
ated complexity, “open to everyone to read, while keeping the
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dignity of its secret meaning for a profounder interpretation” (96).
The word “dignity” implies an elevated, perhaps untouchable status,
while “profounder” connotes both the unfathomable depths of
untapped memory and a conscious striving toward divine under-
standing. Augustine treats the “symbol” as a worldly matter on an
even lower plane than the Bible’s surface meaning. He writes:
May [God’s] ministers now do their work on
‘earth,’ not as they did on the waters of unbelief
when their preaching and proclamation used
miracles and sacred rites and mystical prayers to
attract the attention of ignorance, the mother of
wonder, inducing the awe aroused by secret
symbols.  (Augustine 290)
Early converts suffer such “ignorance,” or privation of God, that
they must be lured away from sin by spectacle. Augustine writes
derisively of these performances, calling ignorance “the mother of
wonder,” distinguishing, in other words, euphoria in God from mere
excitement and curiosity. His ironic use of “sacred” and “mystical”
reaffirms that language may have degrees of truthfulness, unlike the
unchanging Word. Finally, Augustine contrasts the Bible’s “secret
meaning” to the awe-inducing “secret symbols,” demonstrating his
belief that external signs of faith are mere formalities, and “symbols”
– suggesting vested secular meaning – signify little.
Augustine reiterates his low valuation of religious “symbols”
when he condemns Christians who request “signs and wonders […]
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desired not for any salvific end but only for the thrill” (212), appar-
ently using “sign” and “symbol” interchangeably. The images placed
contextually near “signs” and “symbols” in the above passages, such
as “attract,” “inducing,” “aroused,” “desired,” and “thrill,” connote
the onset of sexual excitement. These intimations convey
Augustine’s reproof, tying signs and symbols not only to the secular
but also to the puerile. The libidinal associations also imply a latent
threat in spectacular practices, since sexuality is Augustine’s primary
obstacle to conversion (152-53). Augustine further links public
religious displays to privation from God by repeating “wonders” in
the second passage and by lamenting, “Lord, my God… how many
machinations are used by the Enemy to suggest to me that I should
seek from you some sign!” As Augustine believes evil is a relative
absence from God (43), the “Enemy” implies ignorance of the
Word. Augustine contends that signs and symbols are not clear
images of the Word and may indeed be obstacles to apprehending
Truth.
Foucauldian thinkers may recognize in Augustine’s secularly
charged, subtly menacing signs and symbols their own conception
of public demonstrations of power. However, Foucault crucially
omits religious motivation in his discussion of medieval legal ritual,
while for Augustine no activity is fully secular because God alone
provides form or being (67). Secular power for Augustine consti-
tutes a detraction from the Word, or relative lack of spiritual sub-
stance, as opposed to meaningful active mechanisms. Augustine and
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Foucault’s theories nonetheless converge in ways that may attract a
Foucauldian reading of the Confessions. For example, much like
Foucault, Augustine involves the sign in public performances. Both
thinkers also attribute to such spectacles a secular power and an
implied threat; and both Augustine and Foucault believe the truth-
value of signs is contextual, contingent in part upon the spirit of the
audience.
Presenting a general challenge for contemporary theorists,
the “sign” has evolved in conventional usage to mean something
unlike Augustine’s definition.  Ferdinand de Saussure defines a
linguistic “sign” as the arbitrary union of a “signifier” and a “signi-
fied,” or a particular conceptual meaning (66-67). Contemporary
theorists have subtly altered this definition to reflect their own
theories, but Foucault appeals partly to the conventional sense when
he analogizes torture to inscription using linguistic signs. He uses the
term metonymically for all communicative acts, rendering his “sign”
comparable to Augustine’s public rituals. However, the relationship
between Augustine and Foucault’s “sign” becomes more complex in
light of Foucault’s peculiar definition of the term. In The Johns
Hopkins Guide to Literary Theory & Criticism, Louis Montrose
synthesizes post-structuralism and New Historicism – the schools of
thought with which Foucault self-identifies – when he expresses that
“every human act is embedded in an arbitrary system of signification
that social agents use to make sense of their world.” A discursive
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matrix “embed[s],” or subsumes, its constituents and co-creators,
the “social agents” who are but one subject and many objects.
Foucault thus treats the sign as born of and contingent upon
a network of authoritative mechanisms. Similarly, Augustine per-
ceives a secular energy that informs and empowers signs with an
implicitly puerile affect. Foucault’s assertion that signs fall within a
matrix of domination appears to cohere with Augustine’s view that
all meaning arises from on high. However, to the extent that signs
present an active threat to faith, they appeal only to the basest
temptations, which are potentially transgressive for Augustine rather
than binding as in Foucault’s system. In addition, signification for
Foucault is “arbitrary,” whereas for Augustine the closest parallel is
observers’ relative distance from the Truth. Augustine believes that
language’s relation to the Word is unchanging; only interpretation
moves closer to or further from the Word.
Augustine narrates his conversion experience largely in
terms of an evolving understanding of Truth in religious language.
For example, he writes that in his late Manichean stage he cannot
conceptualize “spiritual substance” as something outside space and
time (Augustine 89-94). Describing a moment of great spiritual trial,
he writes:
My heart vehemently protested against all the
physical images in my mind and by this single blow I
attempted to expel from my mind’s eye the swarm
of unpurified notions flying about there […. He fails
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to exorcise the images].  My eyes are accustomed
to such images. My heart accepted the same
structure. (Augustine 111-12)
Augustine depicts his overly physical imagination of spiritual “sub-
stance” as a “swarm of unpurified notions” emanating from his
“mind’s eye.” Augustine’s observation that images of material
substances constitute a “swarm” implies proliferating, irritating
thoughts uncurtailed by Truth-directed reason. In addition, “mind’s
eye” connotes a special compartment of memory for storing sensory
images apart from interpretation. The word “eye,” in particular,
juxtaposes a bodily image with Augustine’s false conception of a
“spiritual” object, relating Augustine’s preoccupation with corporeal
matters to his distance from the Truth. Finally, Augustine under-
scores the synonymy of God and Truth by characterizing the false
images as “unpurified,” stressing that all human knowledge is
sanctified by God.
The description “physical images” anticipates Augustine’s
extended discussion of Platonic categories of representation in
relation to memory. The basest images are “all kinds of objects
brought in by sense-perception,” or images of physical sensations
that are catalogued unreflectively by memory, while more elevated
memories involve intelligent altering of “the deliverance of the
senses,” or rational interpretation of sense-perceptions to create
meaning. The highest memories approach “the invisible things of
God… [in] the things which are made,” acknowledging sense-
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perceptions merely as expressive images of the Word (Augustine
184-85). These memories are the most “inward,” and Augustine
writes that in his most transcendent memories “[t]here also I meet
myself” (186), reasserting the connection between self-knowledge
and knowledge of God.
Augustine’s manipulations of sense-perception evoke both
Lacanian and Derridian theories, but his conceptualization of
memory defies contemporary theoretical terms. Augustine clearly
distinguishes between imagination of “the invisible things of God,” or
spiritual substance, and rational interpretation of sensory phenom-
ena, as does Lacan. Both theorists also believe that imagining ideal
entities relates more closely to the origin of selfhood than does
apprehending spatial reality. Lacan’s “mirror stage” invokes along-
side the “ideal-I” a virtual reflective space that conditions future
relations between the “I function” and physical space. The infant
assumes and anticipates an ideal space over which he will possess
absolute subjectivity, so the reality of social and natural space
constitutes a disappointment and discordance (Lacan 6). Crucially,
Lacan treats the ideal-I and its virtual space as figments that adhere
to a fractured self and exacerbate inner discord, whereas Augustine
believes that unity with God is precognizant and something to be
reacquired through “the invisible things of God.” According to
Augustine, the faculties that transform sense-perceptions into
intimations of the Word resolve “inward” conflict and enable
progress toward divine comprehension.
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Likewise, Jacques Derrida echoes Augustine’s preoccupa-
tion with hidden meaning. Both Augustine and Derrida believe that
images simultaneously express a direct meaning and a suppressed,
dissimilar meaning. For Augustine, sense-perceptions are rationally
apprehensible, but they also stand for “the invisible things of God”
that are far removed from physical matter and rational thought.
Similarly, Derrida’s linguistic sign comprises both a direct meaning
and intimations of the converse. According to Derrida, a “privileged
signifier” constitutes the external marker for a sign’s direct significa-
tion, comparable to Augustine’s rational interpretation of an image.
The privileged signifier provides an automatic interpretation, as
opposed to the converse, whose signification is implied rather than
represented – just as, for Augustine, God’s Word imperceptibly
infuses all things. Despite these complementary views on the pres-
ence of hidden meaning, Augustine and Derrida hold antithetical
beliefs about the nature of representation. While Augustine trusts in
a stable Word, Derrida contends that language has no fundamental
structure or orientation.
In what ultimately becomes “Deconstructionism,” Derrida
identifies the converse of a privileged signifier and restates both
terms in a relationship of difference (967), proposing an alternative
conceptual arrangement that avoids the delimiting power of “truth.”
In Derrida’s methodology, hidden meaning assumes equal impor-
tance to that of the privileged signifier, whereas Augustine affirms
Truth’s unchanging preeminence and treats its secret emanations as
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greater than the objects of rational observation. Crucially, Derrida’s
“truth” is not Augustine’s “Truth,” and Derrida envisions an ideal
rather more like the latter in that Deconstructionism makes manifest
all concepts and undermines linguistic boundaries. Derrida’s “truth”
refers to a consensus viewpoint reached within discourse and
reflects to some extent the truth-value Augustine assigns to “signs”
and “symbols.” However, even in their shared hope for a whole
consciousness, Augustine’s theory remains quite unlike Derrida’s
because he locates Truth in an ordered space while
Deconstructionism proposes something immediately disordering.
Augustine moves toward Truth both by learning from the
Bible and by interacting with other Christians. Just as the Bible
intimates its meaning to beginners through simple language, August-
ine writes that at first he listens only to Ambrose’s “rhetorical
technique”:
Nevertheless together with the words which I was
enjoying, the subject matter, in which I was uncon-
cerned, came to make an entry into my mind. I
could not separate them […]. [T]here entered no
less the truth which he affirmed, though only gradu-
ally.  (Augustine 88)
In other words, memorable, true language supplants disorganized,
“unpurified” notions despite the listener’s resistant will. The phrase
“make an entry into my mind” connotes stealth as well as sensible
structure, in contrast to Augustine’s false “swarm.” Augustine
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reasserts that thought and language are inextricable through the
phrases “could not separate them” and “no less.” However, he
grasps only a fraction of the words’ meaning since he cannot yet
apprehend Ambrose’s life in the Word. The phrase “though only
gradually” depicts the subjective truth-value of words, whose
meaning varies with the individual’s spiritual state. Through
Ambrose’s guidance, Augustine comes to reinterpret the Holy
Scriptures, which are “no longer read with an eye to which they had
previously looked absurd” (94). Augustine’s passive role in relation
to the Bible, as in “came before me” and “were no longer read,”
suggests that the text’s infusion with the Word itself compels greater
understanding.
However, Augustine also believes that active linguistic
exchanges can provoke spiritual progress though they must be
guided by God’s grace in order to be productive. His own
conversion draws upon an oral recounting of the life of Antony, the
Egyptian monk, as well as a complementary tale of two men so
moved by Athanasius’s “Life of St. Antony” that they convert at
once (Augustine 142). The “Life of Antony” critically reappears at
Augustine’s moment of conversion, when he recalls the
transformative potential of language and “pick[s] up and read[s]” a
randomly selected page of the Bible, which empowers him to avow
chastity (153). Augustine seeks in his Confessions to write an
analogue to the “Life of Antony,” a conversion narrative sanctioned
by God such that it “stir[s] up the heart” (180) to intimations of a
54
greater, universal truthfulness. “I pray,” he writes, “that … [despite
human misunderstanding] I may say what, occasioned by [Christ’s]
words, [God’s] truth wished me to say” (272), acknowledging that
ultimately the truth-value of any words uttered by humans must be
accepted on faith.
In Augustine’s view, whenever Christians organize their raw
impressions to make confession, they participate in an ascendant
movement that intrinsically praises God (Augustine 3). Augustine’s
most passionate remarks on the potential accessibility of God
simultaneously underscore that knowledge and representation are
subjective in relation to an objective Truth. In his above prayer,
Augustine reconciles the social need to share “truth” with the
seeming incommensurability of general human and divine under-
standing by accepting fragmentary truth and praying for further
guidance. Contemporary theorists grapple with a similar problem in
the absence of an ideal fixed Truth; discourse comprises a multitude
of subjective voices, and the more personal an individual’s relation-
ship to truth, the more difficult it becomes to meaningfully accom-
modate incongruous viewpoints. Augustine’s text may appear
sympathetic to this challenge, but Augustine emphasizes that Christ
enables all humans to someday fully comprehend God’s Word.
Augustine’s Confessions presents concepts and terms in
translation that seem coherent with those of such contemporary
theorists as Foucault, Lacan, and Derrida, but the crucial points of
divergence make theoretical readings problematic. This paper has
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dealt mainly with linguistic representations in relation to Truth, but
there are many other intriguing avenues of study. For example, the
Confessions employs corporeal imagery in relation to the Word,
which Foucauldians especially might find compelling. Applied with
meticulous discernment, contemporary literary theory might augment
our present understanding of the text, but the potential is great for
slight misapplications of terms that would then confound two
antithetical worldviews. The difficulties associated with the Confes-
sions suggest that other pre-modern texts should be evaluated
similarly before contemporary theoretical interpretations are at-
tempted.
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